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ABSTRACT
This project investigates the effects of social identity and personal characteristics on foreign
policy decision making. The two main US political parties, Democrats and Republicans, were
used as markers for social identity. Participants were first instructed to read a scenario regarding
a hostile fictional country followed by a speech regarding the same fictional country. Two
speeches were created using a content analysis of speeches from Democrats and Republicans
prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Participants were randomly placed into one of four conditions.
One condition paired a Democratic-themed speech with a Republican Speaker, another paired a
Democratic speech with a Democratic Speaker, the third paired a Republican speech with a
Democratic speaker, and the last paired a Republican speech with a Republican speaker.
Participants then answered a survey that asked about their policy preferences regarding the
fictional country. Manipulated variables were found to be insignificant, whereas the personality
characteristics presented different levels of significance based on models of regression analysis.
The data indicates that personality characteristics may be a more salient predictor of foreign
policy preferences than social identity.
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INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND THEORY
Understanding psychology is integral to the understanding of politics. Given that politics is
an institution that involves the interactions between people, an understanding of human beings is
vital to the understanding of politics.
One major concept within psychology with far reaching implications for the world of
politics is Social Identity Theory. First outlined by Henry Tajfel in 1970, Social Identity Theory
explains that the social groups to which a person belongs provide a sense of self as well as
esteem for the individual. The present study is an application of Social Identity Theory to the
concept of political science, and more specifically, foreign policy. Within Social Identity Theory,
there exists many important concepts. The first of which is the ingroup. An ingroup is any group
to which a person belongs. As discussed below, an individual’s ingroup is a major force in the
shaping of their opinions, especially when it comes to novel issues. A person will exhibit bias
towards other members of their ingroup, trusting and valuing their opinions more, and favoring
this group over outside groups. Ingroups can form based on shared interests, ethnic background,
worldview, political party, or any other characteristic an individual may possess.
A second concept within Social Identity Theory is the outgroup. When an individual
becomes part of an ingroup, they also create outgroups. An outgroup is any group that is outside
of a person’s ingroup. Members of an outgroup can be members of an opposing sports team,
people who prefer a different entertainment source from the individual, supporters of an
opposing political party; any person who exhibits an identity that is different from the individual
may be part of the outgroup.
In various studies, Tajfel demonstrated that splitting individuals even by the simplest
dimensions can create a sense of group solidarity that leads to bias, both for their “ingroup” and
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against their “outgroup” (Tajfel, 1970). Further research out of Rutgers University demonstrates
that when judging the level of independence of a speaker in crafting a speech that represents their
viewpoints, participants both attributed more independence to and recalled more of the messages
when they were delivered by a member of their ingroup (Wilder, 1990).
Further, a study in 1990 demonstrates that participants have a low level of persuasion that
is equal for well-crafted messages as well as poorly crafted ones, when the speaker is a member
of the outgroup (Mackie et al., 1990). This idea was further demonstrated by Mackie et al. in
1992. In this study, participants were exposed to both strong and weak arguments from ingroup
and outgroup speakers. Half of the participants heard the position of the message before it was
delivered, and half of the participants heard the position of the message after it was delivered.
The study found that when participants had prior knowledge of the position of the ingroup
speaker, they accepted the ingroup position regardless of the quality of the message. Outgroup
messages had virtually no persuasive effects, even with strong messages. This study supports the
idea that individuals will agree with a member of their ingroup with demonstrably less
persuasion needed than they will for members of the outgroup (Mackie et al., 1992). Human
individuals clearly develop ingroup bias when placed in groups, and will understand, listen more
intently to, and be more persuaded by messages from a member of their in group than from a
member of their outgroup.
American politics is split into two main groups -- the Democrats and the Republicans.
Though there are many other parties, the vast majority of American voters typically vote for
either the Republican or the Democrat in elections. In recent years, American politics has
increased in its tension and polarization. We can see this in the interactions between politicians
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like Donald Trump and Nancy Pelosi. Given the hyper-polarized climate of American politics, it
seems very pertinent to study how Social Identity can affect political views.
For the purposes of this study, an individual’s ingroup will be their political party, while
their outgroup will be the opposing political party. Thus, for a participant who identifies as a
Democrat, another Democrat will be part of their ingroup, and a Republican would represent
their outgroup. The Democrats represent the left side of the political spectrum, while the
Republicans represent the right side of the political spectrum.
A Swedish study published in 2020 demonstrated that candidates who were most loyal to
their political party’s views received more votes, showcasing how a political party can serve as a
unifying force that becomes an ingroup for the citizens (Folke and Rickne, 2020). This is further
supported in a study by Fielding et al., where researchers presented arguments for a carbon tax
policy with four differentiations- whether the policy was endorsed by members of the
Republican or the Democratic Party and whether the policy was promoted using Democratic or
Republican values. The study found that participants of both parties had more positive responses
and greater support for the policy when they believed that it was endorsed by members of the
political party they supported, their ingroup. They also found that Democratic participants had
more favorable responses to the policy when it was framed through Democratic values. This was
not found for Republicans in the experiment (Fielding et al., 2019). This study showed that
regardless of the specifics of a message, people are more likely to support it when it is delivered
by a member of their ingroup. As Cohen (2003) demonstrated, participants' attitudes towards a
policy, even when participants were instructed to process the policy in an effortful way, were
almost exclusively formed by whether or not the policy was within the stated position of their
political party. They were able to find that this factor was more significant than the objective
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content of the policy, as well as the participants' beliefs. Additionally, Kam (2005) found that
when participants were less aware of certain issues, the position of their party was a major
heuristic used to form their opinion.
Party loyalty is the concept that members of a political party should uphold the ideals of
that party, rather than emphasizing their own personal opinions. Parties all over the world seek to
maintain a high level of party loyalty, making the party more unitary and coordinated in its
messaging. A Canadian case study showed that political parties in Canada demand that
candidates promote the party brand, relinquishing individual opinions and values in favor of
centralized party messaging (Marland and Wagner, 2020). This shows the internal, ingroup
functioning of political parties, which reward those that go along with party wishes and put
pressure on those who dissent. In American politics, the hyper-polarized climate creates a great
need for party loyalty. In fact, a study published in 2020 used virtual scenarios in which
participants had to choose a candidate based on partisanship and policies deemed
unconstitutional or undemocratic to demonstrate that participants valued other factors, such as
partisan loyalty and political ideology, over certain democratic principles. In the study, only
13.1% of participants were willing to defect and vote against a candidate who shared their
political party when that candidate violated democratic principles (Graham & Svolik, 2020). This
study demonstrates that in the US, party loyalty is a highly valued concept, and paints American
political parties as highly coordinated and cohesive.
A 1951 study investigating public opinion on foreign policy in the midst of a growing rift
between the Democrats and the Republicans after years of a united front on international
relations found that both general reactions to foreign policy and reactions to specific
international issues were split along party lines in such a way that suggests that a sizable portion
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of respondents were voting based on party rather than personal attitudes (Belknap & Campbell,
1951). What’s more, a study published in 2020 demonstrated that the policy opinions of citizens
changed immediately and to a great degree when the position of their party changed. This study
jumped on the research opportunity that came with swift policy changes during the Great
Recession in Denmark and found that those who self-identified as supporters of the parties that
instituted these policy changes showed an increase in support for these kinds of policies, even
though the policies were incongruent with the prior positions of the party and themselves
(Slothuus & Bisgaard, 2020). These studies both demonstrate the large effects that Social
Identity can have on the policy opinions of citizens.
In a study published in 2019, which analyzed the relationship between frequency of elite
references and longitudinal public data regarding opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
finding that as the partisan cues became clearer and more available, and the conflict became
more characterized by differences along party lines, citizens became more opinionated about the
issue, suggesting that elite cues aided in the formation of opinions of citizens (Cavari &
Freedman, 2019). Additionally, a survey conducted by US news outlets ABC and The
Washington Post found that in 2013, 22% of Republicans in the US favored the US bombing of
Syria in response to the use of chemical weapons by Bashar Al-Assad during the Obama
administration. In 2017, it was found that 86% of Republicans favored the bombing that was
being carried out in Syria for the same reason, only this time under the Republican Trump
administration (Hohman, 2017). This provides further evidence that the political party of a leader
supporting a policy is a big factor in whether individuals will support that policy.
Moreover, a study in 2008 investigated the effects of elite signaling in the media towards
participant opinions of foreign policy events. The study found that messages from media outlets
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with views congruent with the views of the participants affected the views of the participants in a
way that was expected with Social Identity Theory, i.e., when a Democrat heard praise for
Republican President George Bush from a left leaning media outlet, it increased their approval to
a greater degree than when they heard praise from a right leaning outlet, and when a Democrat
heard criticism from a left leaning media outlet, their approval was lower than for a right leaning
media outlet. The data had the same patterns for Republican participants (Baum & Groeling,
2008). Clearly, Social Identity is a major factor in shaping the opinions of citizens, not only in
domestic policy, but in foreign policy as well.
A study in 2018, however, found that participants' opinions on a novel foreign policy issue
were more shaped by the opinions of foreign elites than the opinions of Democratic and
Republican party elites (Guardino & Hayes, 2018). Additionally, a study on the foreign policy
opinions of well-informed students in Turkey found that social identities such as religion were
very impactful to results (Ciftci, 2013). These studies highlight that while political parties have a
large effect on the opinions of their supporters, there are limitations to their power, as well as
other social identities that may guide an individual’s opinions on foreign policy. This makes a
direct investigation on the extent that social identity through political parties influences foreign
policy opinions very important.
Personality characteristics have also been shown to affect the decision making of citizens in
regard to foreign policy. The effects of three psychological variables will be used in the study:
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), Distrust, and Need for Power.
The first psychological variable in the study right-wing authoritarian personality, or the
RWA scale. A person with a higher level of authoritarian tendencies in their personality would
be more likely to use force or violence to solve issues. This connection between Right-Wing
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Authoritarianism and the use of violence is supported by a study by Faragó, Kende and Krekó
(2019) on the rise of tension towards minorities in Hungary. The study investigates whether
propensity for radical action or authoritarianism is a stronger predictor of inter-group violence.
They find that those who justified violence against “symbolically” threatening outgroups were
higher in Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and that Right-Wing Authoritarianism was much more
strongly associated with justification of intergroup violence than propensity for radical action
(Faragó et al., 2019). Right-Wing Authoritarianism is pertinent to the study because a person
who scores higher on this scale may be more willing to use violence in their foreign policy
decision-making. The hypothesis for this variable is that if level of authoritarian personality is
higher, then willingness to use military force should increase as well.
The second variable is distrust. Meta-analysis by Margaret Hermann suggests that
aggressive leaders are highly distrustful of others. (Hermann, 1980). Hermann also states that the
distrust variable can also lead to higher suspicion in the motives and actions of others (Hermann,
2002). Distrust can make leaders assume negative ulterior motives for even the smallest of
things, perceiving the actions of competitors or even just other people as potentially harmful
towards them or their allies (Hermann, 2003). Additionally, a study out of the University of
Central Florida in 2014 investigated the effects of two psychological variables, Need for Power
and Distrust, finding that leaders with higher initiations into militarized interstate disputes had
higher levels of distrust and Need for power, and found a significant main effect of distrust on
the number of militarized interstate disputes (Smith, 2014).
The need for power is our final psychological variable. In psychological research, the
need for power has been associated with an increase in aggression. A study by Dutton and
Strachan (1987) demonstrated a connection between this need and use of aggression. The
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researchers conducted a comparison of adult male wife assaulters, maritally conflicted nonassaulters, and satisfactorily married individuals using Thematic Apperception Tests (TATs)
scored for the need for power. Dutton and Strachan found that those individuals who had
exhibited abusive behaviors towards a spouse had a higher need for power. Additionally, when
the stimulus image for the TAT displayed an ambiguous male-female relationship, those who
had committed assault scored higher in need for power than the average of both control groups
combined (Dutton & Strachan, 1987).
The research of David Winter further contributes to the support for this phenomenon. In a
study of all elected presidents between George Washington and Ronald Reagan (vice presidents
who became president were not included), researchers used initial inaugural addresses to score
each president for motivations, including achievement, affiliation, and power. The study found a
significant correlation between the power motivation of the president and entry into war (Winter,
1987). Another such study by Winter (1980) was done on African leaders. This study used
verbatim responses to questions from reporters that constituted no less than 900 words of
content. These responses were then scored for the power, achievement, and affiliation motives.
The study then had experts on African affairs rate various leaders for “war disposition” and
“activity.” Winter found a significant correlation between the power motive and war disposition
for the African leaders (Winter, 1980).
Findings from Margaret Hermann support this phenomenon as well. In 1980, Hermann
analyzed the personality characteristics of world leaders, finding a correlation between the need
for power, nationalism, and distrust of others. These studies further support the concept that
interpersonal differences manifest in foreign policy differences and that the need for power is a
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significant factor in the use of aggression among leaders, making this variable quite pertinent to
the present study (Hermann, 1980).
The present research investigates whether social identity or participant characteristics have
a greater effect on level of aggression in foreign policy. I will seek to determine if knowing the
political identity of a speaker will influence the participant’s agreement with the message the
speaker delivers, or if their psychological characteristics are better explanations for variance in
the participant levels of aggression. This will contribute to the current research by providing
evidence that either supports the power that political parties have shaping voters’ opinions on
foreign policy, or the limits thereof. Using this background, the Dependent variable to be
assessed in the present study is Level of Aggression in the participant’s foreign policy decision
making. The Independent variables are the Political Identity of the Speaker, Political Identity of
the Speech, Political Identity of the Participant, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Need for Power,
Distrust, and the participant’s gender. Based on the present research, the following hypotheses
are generated:

Social Identity
H0: μ agreement with a message typically associated with the opposing party presented by a
speaker from their party = μ agreement with a message typically associated with the opposing
party presented by a speaker from the opposing party.
H1: μ agreement with a message typically associated with the opposing party presented by a
speaker from the subject’s own party > μ agreement with a message typically associated with the
opposing party presented by a speaker from the opposing party.
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The participants are predicted to have a higher level of agreement with messages that come from
members of their “ingroup,” their political party, even when the message represents the position
typically associated with the opposing party.
The study also includes the three psychological variables that may also influence the
dependent variable.
Right-Wing Authoritarianism
H0: μ level of aggression in foreign policy for participants with low levels of RWA >/= μ
levels of aggression in foreign policy for participants with high levels of RWA.
H1: μ level of aggression in foreign policy for participants with low levels of RWA < μ
levels of aggression in foreign policy for participants with high levels of RWA.
Need for Power
H0: μ level of aggression in foreign policy for participants with low levels of Need for
Power >/= μ levels of aggression in foreign policy for participants with high levels of Need for
Power.
H1: μ level of aggression in foreign policy for participants with low levels of Need for
Power < μ levels of aggression in foreign policy for participants with high levels of Need for
Power.
Distrust
H0: μ level of aggression in foreign policy for participants with low levels of Distrust >/=
μ levels of aggression in foreign policy for participants with high levels of Distrust.
H1: μ level of aggression in foreign policy for participants with low levels of Distrust < μ
levels of aggression in foreign policy for participants with high levels of Distrust.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Participants
137 participants took part in the study. All participants were at least 18 years old. Some
participants were recruited through political science classes, where they were given extra credit
for participation. The other participants were recruited through the UCF participant recruitment
website, SONA. This program was selected for its ease of delivering the study to a wide array of
participants and for its ease of use. Participants were awarded one credit point for their
participation in the study.
Materials
•

Scenario: A paragraph scenario discussing a fictional country. (Appendix A)

•

Political Party Representative Speeches: Paragraph-long speeches that present a
position on the fictional country discussed in the scenario. (Appendices B and C)

•

Dependent variable: A four-item scale used to determine the participant’s position
on the fictional country (Appendix D)

•

Need for Power Scale: A four item assessment of the need for power, developed
by Schönbrodt, F, & Gerstenberg, F. (2012) (Appendix E)

•

Four-Item F Scale: A scale used to determine authoritarian tendencies in the
personalities of the participants. Developed by Lane (1955). (Appendix F)

•

Faith in People Scale: A scale used to determine the trust that participants have in
other people. This questionnaire was developed by Rosenberg (1957). (Appendix
G)
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•

Questionnaire: The actual questionnaire, which assesses the variables nPwr,
Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and Distrust, as well as subjects’ positions on the
fictional country of Tajfalan. (Appendix H)

Procedure
The necessary materials for the study were delivered using the UCF Qualtrics System.
First, participants received a consent document, to which they had to respond with affirmation of
consent if they were to continue with the study. Participants were then randomly exposed to one
of two speeches that represent the two opposing positions toward a fictional country. These
positions were based on those held by the major political parties just before the 2003 invasion of
Iraq and were derived from a content analysis of speeches delivered in Congress between
January and March of 2003. When the speeches were given to the participants, each speech was
delivered with a stated speaker who was either Republican or Democrat, meaning that these two
variables together created four conditions on their own. There was a condition in which
participants were exposed to a speech representing the Republican position, and told that it was
delivered by a Republican, a condition in which participants were given a speech representing
the Republican position, but were told that it was delivered by a Democrat, a condition in which
participants received a speech representing the position of the Democrats, and told that it was
delivered by a Democrat, and a condition in which participants were exposed to a speech
representative of the position of the Democrats, but were told that it was delivered by a
Republican. After exposure to the speech, participants received a paragraph outlining a situation
involving the fictional country mentioned in the speeches. After reading this, participants were
given a survey that determined their opinion on which direction the US should take regarding the
fictional country. This survey also included questions that investigate the psychological variables
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and asks general demographics questions. I analyzed the main effects of speaker political
identity, message political identity, and participant political identity, along with the interaction
effects across the three factors. The effects of the psychological variables were also analyzed and
reported as regression models.
Research Design
In selecting the case that will be the basis for the study, I first reviewed speeches
representing the positions of each party regarding several different countries, including China,
India, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. I found that the speeches delivered in the months prior to the
invasion of Iraq in 2003 were a perfect case for my study, in that the two sides had opposite
positions in rhetoric. While the vast majority of the Republican Party supported escalating
tensions and using force against the Hussein regime in Iraq, most Democrats discussed the lack
of an imminent reason to go to war. Fully opposing political positions were necessary for the
study, because the speeches delivered to the participants needed to represent two distinct sides.
After gathering the speeches on the case of Iraq, I systematically examined the speeches to
determine what the positions of each party were at the time, going over thirty speeches for each
side to determine if there was a group consensus and to extract common arguments. The creation
of speeches based on the two sides of the issue required a significant degree of group consensus.
When it was determined that the vast majority of the speeches on both sides were in agreement
as to what direction the United States needed to take in regard to Iraq, I then selected fifteen
pages of representative speeches for each side to content analyze, looking for patterns and
concepts within the speeches, and I used those comments and patterns to construct the speeches
for the study.
Ethical Considerations
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Given that this study will involve the use of human participants, ethics is a matter that
needs to be considered. I completed the CITI training course for conducting ethical behavioral
research using human participants and I submitted the study to the Institutional Review Board to
ensure that it meets the ethical standards of that board.

RESULTS
A three factor ANOVA was conducted using the Political Identity of the Speaker, the Political
Identity of the Speech, and the Participant Political Identity, and calculated the mean scores per
cell for the 2x2x2 design. As can be seen in the ANOVA results Table I, the participant political
identity (F=19.21, DF=1, p< .01) is the only significant main effect. This means that the political
identity of the participants is a strong factor in explaining participant use of aggression. The
interaction effect between the political identity of the speaker, the political identity of the speech,
and the participant political identity approaches significance (F=3.32, p< .1), allowing a
consideration of the 2x2x2 (eight cells) mean scores for an investigation of the effect of Social
Identity on the level of aggression of the participants. The eight mean scores can be seen in Table
II below.
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TABLE I: THREE FACTOR ANOVA
Source

Type III Sum
of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Corrected Model

a

220.179

7

31.454

4.596

.000

Intercept

7545.611

1

7545.611

1102.515

.000

SpeakerID

5.149

1

5.149

.752

.388

SpeechID

2.158

1

2.158

.315

.576

131.497

1

131.497

19.214

.000

SpeakerID * SpeechID

9.111

1

9.111

1.331

.251

SpeakerID * ParticipantID

13.932

1

13.932

2.036

.157

SpeechID * ParticipantID

33.735

1

33.735

4.929

.029

SpeakerID * SpeechID *
ParticipantID

22.741

1

22.741

3.323

.071

Error

732.308

107

6.844

Total

10576.000

115

952.487

114

ParticipantID

Corrected Total
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TABLE II: MEAN SCORES FOR THREE FACTOR ANALYSIS
Democratic Speaker
Participant
ID

Republican Speaker

Democratic Republican Democratic Republican
Speech
Speech
Speech
Speech

Democrat

8.32

8.90

7.60

8.96

Republican

10.29

10.40

13.38

10.00

Cell values are mean scores for aggression in foreign policy decision making

Social Identity should affect the data like this: when participants share an identity with
the speaker, i.e., they belong to the same political party, we would expect their mean scores to
shift in the direction of the speech given by the speaker, even if the content of the speech does
not match the typical values associated with that party. For instance, the mean score for
aggression should be higher for Democratic participants when the speaker is presented as a
Democrat, but the speech has (undeclared) Republican themes (higher aggression) than when the
speaker is Democratic, and the speech has Democratic themes (less aggression). An example of
this is in the cell with a mean score of 8.9, where Democratic participants received a Democraticlabeled Speaker giving a Republican-themed speech. This score is higher than the mean for
Democratic participants with a Democratic speaker and a Democratic-themed speech (M=8.32).
The rest of the data, however, show a different story.
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One example is Republican participants in the condition with a Republican speaker and a
Democratic-themed speech, which has a higher level of aggression than participants in any other
condition (M=13.37), even though social identity would predict a shift in the opposite. The mean
for this condition, if Social Identity had an effect on the levels of aggression in foreign policy,
would be expected to be lower than the mean for Republicans who received a Republicanthemed speech from a Republican (M=10.0). Additionally, it was expected that participants who
were Democrats would have a higher level of aggression when they received a Democraticthemed speech from a Republican than when they had a Republican themed speech from a
Republican, because of the expectation that a Democrat would go against the Republican
speaker’s position. What we find in the data, however, is a lower mean level of aggression
(M=7.6) for Democrats in the Democratic Speech-Republican speaker condition than Democrats
in the Republican Speech-Republican speaker condition (M=8.96). The Democrats were going
along with the message delivered by the Republican speaker. Overall, in the data, there is no
consistent effect of Social Identity found across the mean scores. In fact, the majority of the
means in the analysis do not fit the Social Identity expectation. This is discussed further in the
Discussion Section.
Another interesting aspect of the ANOVA results is the significant interaction effect
between the political identities of the participants and the political leanings of the speeches,
F(1,107)= 4.93, p=.03. Because of the significance of this interaction, further analysis was
necessary to investigate the direction and details of this interaction effect. The mean scores for
the interaction of Speech ID and Participant ID can be found in Table III.
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TABLE III: MEAN SCORES: SPEECH ID BY PARTICIPANT ID
Speech ID
Participant ID

Democrat

Republican

8.05

8.94

11.93

10.16

Democrat

Republican

Cell values are mean scores for aggression in foreign policy decision making

To further investigate this interaction, I looked at the simple effects of Speech ID within
Participant ID. For the Democratic Participants, the difference in means across the Speeches was
not found to be significant, F(1,113)= 1.57, p=.212. Even though the difference was not
statistically significant, it is worth nothing the direction of the difference in those mean scores:
when the speech made the case for more aggression, the Democrats averaged slightly higher
aggression, as one might expect. The Republican participants, however, had the opposite pattern.
There is a significant difference in means for Republican participants across the speeches,
F(1,113)= 3.99, p=.048. This difference went in the opposite direction of what was expected
given the speeches. When Republican participants heard a speech that emphasized restraint, they
had a higher mean level of aggression (M=11.93) than when they heard a speech that emphasized
aggression (M=10.16).
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The data suggests a kind of knee-jerk reaction among Republican participants to hearing
a speech that emphasized restraint; hearing the suggestion of restraint actually led to more
aggressive behavior, not more restraint. When we return to the cell values for full 2x2x2
ANOVA in Table II, we see that the greatest value for level of aggression was for Republican
participants hearing a Democratic Speech from a Republican Speaker. This knee-jerk reaction to
increase aggression when restraint is emphasized might be explained by the recent hyper
polarization of politics. Republican participants perhaps read the restraint-themed speech and
knew that it did not align with their Republican values, even though it was purportedly given by
a Republican speaker, and they went the complete opposite way, choosing to act with even more
aggression than they otherwise might have.
With a lack of Social Identity effect in the ANOVA data, the question arises as to what
other factors may be influencing subjects’ aggression levels. Thus, we turn to an analysis of the
other factors included in the study by looking at regression models, which are presented in Table
IV below. While they show no significant effect on the data in the ANOVA analysis, the two
manipulated variables (the political identity of the speech and the political identity of the
speaker) are included in the regression analysis to further investigate their possible effects. The
first model in Table IV is the fully specified model with all independent variables included:
speaker political identity (Speaker PID), political identity of the speech (Speech PID), participant
political identity (Participant PID), Level of Distrust (Distrust), Right-Wing Authoritarianism
(RWA), Need for Power (nPwr), and Participant Gender Identity (Gender).
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TABLE IV:REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Independent Variable
Political Identity of the Speaker
Political Identity of the Speech
Participant Political Identity
Level of Distrust
Right Wing Authoritarianism
Need for Power
Participant Gender Identity
Test Statistics
R2
Adjusted R2
N

Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

Model V

-0.04
0.46
0.39
0.46
0.15
0.15
0.14
0.09
0.34***
0.10
0.04
0.07
-0.61
0.45

-0.02
0.46
0.39
0.46
0.15
0.15
0.14*
0.09
0.35***
0.09
---0.64
0.45

0.02
0.48
0.13
0.48
0.43***
0.15
----0.15**
0.07
---

-0.11
0.48
0.19
0.48
0.36**
0.15
0.25***
0.09
-----0.67
0.47

0.09
0.46
0.37
0.46
0.17
0.15
--0.38***
0.09
0.05
0.07
-0.61
0.46

0.23
0.19
136

0.23
0.19
136

0.10
0.08
137

0.14
0.11
136

0.21
0.18
136

Table Key:
Cell values are the B coefficient followed by the Standard Error below it.
Asterisks are significance indicators as follows:
*= p </= .10
**= p</= .05
***= p</= .01

The only significant variable in the full model is RWA (B= .338, p<.01); higher RightWing Authoritarianism is a significant predictor of higher aggression levels in subjects. Every
one-unit increase in Right-Wing Authoritarianism in a participant’s personality leads to an
average increase in their level of aggression in foreign policy of .338. This begins to indicate that
the factors that make up a participant’s personality may have a greater effect on their foreign
policy decision making than their Social Identity. Overall, the fully specified model does a
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modest job of explaining variance in subjects’ levels of aggression; the R2 value (.23) indicates
that nearly a quarter of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by these variables.
No other factor approaches significance in this particular model. One possible reason for
this is the likelihood of multicollinearity between the independent variables. Several variables
are significantly correlated, including RWA and Participant PID (B=.426, p<.01). In the study,
Republican participants were found to have higher RWA tendencies in their personality. Another
significant correlation was found between RWA and Distrust (B=.365, p<.01), meaning that
those with higher levels of RWA were found to be less trusting of others. RWA was also
correlated with nPwr (B=.302, p<.01), meaning that those participants with higher levels of
Right-Wing Authoritarianism in their personality also had higher levels of Need for Power.
Finally, there was a slight correlation found between nPwr and Distrust (B=.239, p<.01).
Multiple correlations between independent variables in a study can produce multicollinearity,
which can mask the effects of variables when included together in a regression model. For that
reason, models other than the fully specified model were necessary for analysis. I ran many
different versions of models with various combinations of the independent variables to look for
patterns exhibited in the data. Examples of these additional models are also presented in Table
IV and discussed below.
The second model includes Speaker PID, Speech PID, Participant PID, Distrust, RWA,
and Gender. The Distrust variable approaches significance (B=.14, p<.1), and the RWA variable
is once again highly significant (B=.35, p<.01). This means that for this model, the Distrust
variable has a positive relationship with aggression; every increase of 1 unit for the Distrust
variable produced an increase of .14 in the dependent variable, level of aggression. We find this
same directionality in the relationship between RWA and the dependent variable, meaning that
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as levels of Right-Wing Authoritarianism increase, the level of aggression increases in the
participant’s foreign policy choices. While gender is not significant in this or any of the models,
the sign is consistent in all the models where it is included, and a bivariate regression model (not
reported here) was significant, indicating that males tended to be more aggressive than females.
Overall, this model is as valuable in explaining the aggression as the full factor model, with an
R2 of .23, meaning that again, almost a quarter of the variance in the dependent variable is
explained by the variables in this model.
The third model highlighted the significance of nPwr and Participant PID, and included
Speaker PID, Speech PID, Participant PID, and nPwr. Participant PID is highly significant
(B=.434, p<.01), and nPwr was found to be significant (B= .153, p<.05). The relationship
between Participant PID and the dependent variable is positive, indicating that those participants
who are more Republican have higher levels of aggression in their foreign policy decisions. For
every movement of one unit towards the Republican end of the PID scale, there is an increase in
aggression of .434. NPwr also has a positive relationship with the dependent variable, meaning
that as the level of nPwr increases in the participants’ personalities, use of aggression in foreign
policy increases as well. For every one unit increase in nPwr, there is an increase in aggression
of .15. The R2 statistic of .10 for this model indicates that the model explains 10 percent of the
variance in the dependent variable.
The fourth model highlights the significance of Participant PID and Distrust and includes
Speaker PID, Speech PID, Participant PID, Distrust, and Gender. Participant PID is significant
(B=.361, p<.05) and Distrust is highly significant (B=.245, p<.01). These relationships are
congruent with other findings in the models: the relationship between PID and level of
aggression is such that every one-unit shift towards the Republican end of the scale coincides
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with an increase in aggression by .361. The positive relationship between Distrust and aggression
indicates that a one unit increase in Distrust coincides with an increase in aggression of .245. The
RWA variable is not in this model, and these two variables, Distrust and Participant PID, are
generally significant only when RWA is not present. The effect of this model on the data is
moderate. With an R2 of .14, 14% of the variance in level of aggression is explained by these
variables.
The final model highlights the robustness of the RWA variable’s significance across the
data, and includes Speaker PID, Speech PID, Participant PID, RWA, NPwr, and Gender. RWA
is highly significant (B=.378, p< .01): as RWA increases by one unit, level of aggression also
sees an increase of .378 for this model. RWA is consistently the most powerful variable in
explaining differences in levels of aggression in foreign policy decision making, and even when
other variables that RWA is correlated with are present, the RWA variable holds its high level of
significance. The effects of this model on level of aggression are not vast, though they are
notable: with an R2 of .21, over one fifth of the variance in the dependent variable for this model
can be explained by the variables present.
Even after controlling for RWA, nPwr, distrust, gender, and participant ID, the
manipulated experimental variables in the study were not significant, meaning that they did not
have a consistent effect on the dependent variable. The Participant PID variable is positively
correlated with use of aggression and is the second most powerful explanatory variable behind
RWA: Republican participants are more likely to use force in their foreign policy decision
making than Democratic participants. Further, even though RWA and Participant PID are the
strongest independent variables, they cannot be in the same model together because of their high
correlation. Distrust also has a positive relationship with aggression, meaning that those who
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have lower levels of trust in others are more likely to use force in their foreign policy decisions.
The same relationship was found in RWA and nPwr, meaning that for all of the psychological
variables, Distrust, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and the Need for Power, the more a participant
exhibits these characteristics, the more likely they are to use force against the fictional country.
Finally, Gender was found to have a negative relationship with aggression, meaning that women
are less likely to use force against the fictional country than men, though those findings are not
statistically significant in the multi-variate models. Based on the findings, participant
characteristics, including political party, gender, and psychological factors, have a greater effect
on their decision making than their Social Identity.
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DISCUSSION
The findings above indicate that Social identity was not as important as originally
expected in explaining variance in participant responses. One possible reason for this is the
potential that participants were able to see through the speeches. This possibility is supported by
the presence of a correlation between the Political Identity of the Speech and the Political Party
the participant guessed that the speech represented. The correlation shows that a statistically
significant portion of the participants were able to guess the actual party of the speech. If
participants were able to see through the speeches, then the stated political identity of the speaker
would likely not have as much of an effect on their perception of the speech, meaning that Social
Identity would not be a factor.
Another possible reason for the lack of a visible Social Identity effect is the potential that
participants came into the study knowing their party’s values and usual policy vision and stuck to
that message. The majority of participants in the study came from Political Science classes on a
large college campus. Being young students studying political science, these participants may
have been familiar with the position their party might hold. This may have still been an effect of
Social Identity, as participants may have selected based on their social group’s normal policy
vision. This would explain certain aspects of the 8-cell mean scores, such as the tendency for
Republican participants to have higher levels of aggression when the speaker was presented as a
Democrat but the speech had Republican themes than when the speaker was presented as a
Democrat and the speech had Democratic themes. It also helps explain the data found in the
two-factor interaction analysis between the speech and the speaker, where it was found that
Republicans had a knee-jerk reaction to the speeches: when they heard a speech that emphasized
restraint, they had higher levels of aggression.
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Another factor that might have had an influence on the lack of Social Identity effect on
the present data is the reality of unequal Ns for the factors in the study. I set the survey site
Qualtrics up to randomly assign students to one of the four treatment conditions, assuming that
the randomization would result in at least somewhat similar cell sizes. However, this was not
found to be the case. In addition, of the total number of participants in the study (137), 22 had to
be dropped from the ANOVA analysis, due to their selection of Independent for their Political
Identity. This left a total of 115 participants for the ANOVA analysis, which had eight different
conditions. Finally, of that 115, a large majority of the participants were Democrats (88), leaving
just 27 Republican participants. While ANOVA statistics are generally robust for unequal-n
situations, these larger disparities may have had an adverse effect on the investigation into the
effect of Social Identity.
A discussion of internal and external validity is necessary for further interrogation of the
results. Internal validity is the extent to which a research study creates conditions in which their
manipulations are the only differences between the experimental groups. This is achieved
through randomization and minimization of confounding variables. Because the present research
used identical conditions aside from the manipulations, and participants were placed into these
conditions randomly, it can be assumed that the study had internal validity. There are problems,
however, with external validity in the study, as there are with many experiments. Because
participants were college-aged students, the participants used may not be a good representation
of the country today in education level, income, age, and involvement with the political process.
The data surrounding the psychological variables has a higher level of external validity, due to
the fact that these characteristics are present throughout the population and have been found to
correlate with the higher levels of aggression found in the study.

30

Because the manipulations were found to not have a great effect on participant choices, a
discussion of how these manipulations could be improved is necessary. The speeches used in the
study were simply text speeches. Further studies might include audio or video speeches, which
may carry more weight when presented to participants than a text-only speech. Additionally,
content analysis of a more recent conflict for use with the speeches may have been a better
option. While the use of the Iraq war served its purpose in that it was long enough ago for
participants to fail to guess the conflict that the speeches came from (only 22 correct guesses out
of 137), it may have been too long ago for the positions of the parties to hold relevance in
today’s politics. Content analysis of more recent conflicts would be able to determine this.
Using the data found in the study, other factors showed greater effect on the level of
aggression in participants than the manipulated variables. Participant characteristics had
substantial effects on the dependent variable. Those who were more distrustful of others in the
study had higher levels of aggression in their decision making than those participants who had
low levels of distrust. Another pattern in the analysis of the data was the Need for Power, which
increased along with aggression in foreign policy. The political identity of the participants also
had an effect: Republicans were more likely to use higher aggression levels as a tactic to solve
the situation with the fictional country.
While all of these variables showed significance throughout various models in the
regression analysis, there was one variable that stood out: Right-Wing Authoritarianism. This
variable was consistently significant and had the same direction across all models, with
extremely low p values. This variable consistently and significantly correlated with levels of
aggression in foreign policy decision making, showing that it may be one of the most important
psychological factors in determining levels of aggression in foreign policy.
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We begin to see here the major effects of participant psychological and political
characteristics in determining level of aggression in foreign policy. While more research and
more participants are needed to determine the true effects of social identity, the present data
showcases that in the question of message, messenger, or receiver, the answer may be the
receiver: characteristics of individuals are effective at predicting levels of aggression in foreign
policy cases, and that finding has important implications in many areas such as democracy,
intelligence, and the real-world of foreign policy making.
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APPENDIX A: SCENARIO
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The United States is confronted with a decision regarding an important island country in
the Pacific Ocean. The country of Tajfelia has been hostile to the United States and her allies in
the past. More recently, the island nation has stated their commitment to preserving peace,
though many are wary of that commitment. Historically, Tajfelia has tried to develop some
specialized and dangerous military weapons. Recently, however, they have agreed to allow
oversight of their weapons program by the United Nations and the United States. Tajfelia is ruled
by an authoritarian dictator who has maintained a tight control on his citizens, curtailing free
speech, press, and assembly, while also violating human rights extensively. While the nation
does not currently have any clear capabilities of attacking the United States, there are concerns
about their stockpile of weapons, their intentions toward their neighbors who are friendly with
the US, and their capability of endangering US security interests.

34

APPENDIX B: REPUBLICAN REPRESENTATIVE SPEECH
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My fellow Americans,
Today we face a grave threat posed by the country Tajfalan. This evil and brutal regime wields
unlimited power to repress free speech and violate the human rights of its citizens. They continue
to act as a belligerent force, destabilizing the Middle East and jeopardizing US interests. It is my
belief that any argument for options other than war with Tajfalan is severely misguided. We do
not want to go to war, but Tajfalan has already set us down a path towards war with their
escalatory behavior and stockpiling of weapons.
The other side is of the opinion that this war can be avoided and that there are still options for
peace. In holding this opinion, my colleagues are actively preventing the United States from
carrying out the necessary operations to ensure freedom and security for our citizens. If Tajfalan
is allowed to continue without repercussions, we may see a breakdown of global security unseen
since the expansion of Germany during World War II.
Appeasement is not the answer. If we want to stand up for the American values of freedom,
democracy, and peace, it is with a heavy heart that I recommend that we meet this challenge with
force. Tajfalan is a bully, and the only way to deal with a bully is to bully them back.
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APPENDIX C: DEMOCRAT REPRESENTATIVE SPEECH
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My fellow Americans,
Today we face an important choice that will define who we are as a nation for many years to
come. The regime in Tajfalan is both brutal and repressive. At this time, however, it is my firm
belief that the threat posed by Tajfalan is not at a level that warrants the use of force. We must
remember that war should always be a last resort, and until every other option is exhausted, I
believe that we should not consider it. Many of our citizens understand firsthand the horrible toll
that war can take on the innocents of both sides.
Another concern of mine regarding military intervention in Tajfalan is the economic toll it would
take. If our country declares war, large segments of our budget will need to be diverted to
carrying this out. This means that money will be taken out of our children’s schools, the
Medicare and Medicaid programs that assist our most vulnerable, and many other great
government programs.
We must strive to set an example to the global community for how a peaceful democratic
country should act. An escalation of tensions would not only tarnish our image as a peace- loving
nation, setting a bad example for the world, it may also harm the relationships we have with our
allies.
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APPENDIX D: QUESTIONAIRE FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
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1. Would you support sending US ground troops into Tajfalan?
2. Would you support the US conducting air strikes and other similar operations in Tajfalan?
3. Would you support a US-military led removal of the regime in Tajfalan?
4. Instead of a military response, would you support peaceful economic, legal, and diplomatic
methods for responding to Tajfalan?
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APPENDIX E: NEED FOR POWER SCALE
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1. I enjoy bending others to my will
2. I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my way
3. When people challenge me I want to put them down hard.
4. I want to twist others around my little finger.
Schönbrodt, F, Gerstenberg, F. (2012)
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APPENDIX F: FOUR-ITEM F SCALE
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1. What young people need most of all is strict discipline by their parents.
2. Most people who don’t get ahead just don’t have enough will power.
3. A few good leaders could make this country better than all the laws and talk.
4. People sometimes say that an insult to your honor should not be forgotten. Do you agree or
disagree with that?
Lane (1955)
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APPENDIX G: FAITH IN PEOPLE SCALE
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1. Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can’t be too careful in your
dealings with people. How do you feel about it?
2. Would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to look out
for themselves?
3. If you don’t watch yourself, people will take advantage of you.
4. No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it.
5. Human nature is fundamentally cooperative.
Rosenberg (1957)

.

46

APPENDIX H: FINAL QUESTIONAIRE
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We would now like to ask you some questions about the policies that you think would be best in
dealing with Tajfalan. Please answer each question by selecting a number on the scale from 1-5,
with 1 being that you strongly oppose the policy and 5 being that you strongly support the policy.

1. Would you support sending US ground troops into Tajfalan? (Circle One)
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Oppose

Oppose

Neutral

Support

Strongly Support

2. Would you support the US conducting air strikes and other similar operations in Tajfalan?
(Circle One)
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Oppose

Oppose

Neutral

Support

Strongly Support

3. Would you support a US-military led removal of the regime in Tajfalan? (Circle One)
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Oppose

Oppose

Neutral

Support

Strongly Support

4. Instead of a military response, would you support peaceful economic, legal, and diplomatic
methods for responding to Tajfalan? (Circle One)
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Oppose

Oppose

Neutral

Support

Strongly Support
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Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability.
1. No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

2. People sometimes say that an insult to your honor should not be forgotten. Do you agree or
disagree with that?
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

3. Human nature is fundamentally cooperative.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

4.A few good leaders could make this country better than all the laws and talk.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree
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4.

If you don’t watch yourself, people will take advantage of you.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

5. Please answer option 5.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

6. Most people who don’t get ahead just don’t have enough willpower.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree
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7. Would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to look
out for themselves?
1

2

3

4

5

Almost all
people would
help others

Most people
would help
others

An equal
number of
people would
help others as
would help
themselves

Most people
would look out
for themselves

Almost all
people would
look out for
themselves

8. What young people need most of all is strict discipline by their parents.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

9. Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can’t be too careful in your
dealings with people. How do you feel about it?
1

2

3

4

5

Almost anyone
can be trusted

Most people can
be trusted

The same
number of
people can be
trusted as cannot

Most people
cannot be trusted

Almost no one
can be trusted

Please respond to the following statements to the best of your ability, based on your level of
agreement or disagreement with the statement.
1. I enjoy bending others to my will.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Rather
Disagree

Rather Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree
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2. I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my way.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Rather
Disagree

Rather Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

3. When people challenge me I want to put them down hard.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Rather
Disagree

Rather Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

4. Please answer option 1.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Rather
Disagree

Rather Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

5. I want to twist others around my little finger.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Rather
Disagree

Rather Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

Finally, please answer each of the following questions on yourself and your perceptions of the
study.
1. What gender do you identify as?
Man

Woman

Prefer not to say

2. What is your Age? _____
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3. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or
Independent
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strong
Democrat

Not
Strong
Democrat

Independent,
Near
Democrat

Independent

Independent,
Near
Republican

Not Strong
Republican

Strong
Republican

4. In a brief sentence, please tell us what you think this study is trying to investigate.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

5. Regardless of the politician’s stated party, do you think the speech you read sounded
more like a Democrat or a Republican?
1
Democrat

2
Independent

3
Republican

6. Did the scenario remind you of any global conflict in history? If so, please tell us which
one. _____________________________________________________________
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